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Abstract 
Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so-called 
“truth effect” to meta-cognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements 
are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. While most 
prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is 
known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this 
question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. 
Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series 
of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when 
previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared to when previous 
reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in 
judgments is a finely-tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency-based judgments 
into account. 
 
Keywords: fluency, truth effect, feedback learning, subjective experiences  
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 When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of 
Fluency on Truth Judgments 
Prior research has demonstrated that repeated statements are rated more frequently as 
true than new statements (e.g., Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; Hasher, Goldstein, & 
Toppino, 1977; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). This effect was denoted truth effect (see Hasher, et 
al., 1977, for a first description; Schwartz, 1982) and has been reliably replicated across 
research domains. One prominent explanation holds that repeated statements are rated more 
frequently as true because, compared to new statements, they can be processed more fluently 
(Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Specifically, it is assumed that the fluency experienced while 
encoding a statement is interpreted and used as a metacognitive cue with respect to the 
statement’s truth. Corroborating this fluency-truth hypothesis, it has been demonstrated that 
increasing processing fluency independent of repetition, also produces truth effects. For 
instance, it has been shown that statements printed in high as compared to low color contrast 
are processed more fluently, and that this processing fluency translates into increased ratings 
of truth (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007). Moreover, statements are rated as 
more probably true when prior semantic activation (priming) facilitates processing (Kelley & 
Lindsay, 1993). Because fluency is manipulated independently of repetition, both of these 
findings suggest that repetition is not a necessary condition for truth effects. Rather, it appears 
that repetition-based truth effects are mediated via processing fluency (cf., Reber & Schwarz, 
1999; see Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011; for a discussion of the independent 
effects of fluency and positivity). 
Yet why do individuals associate fluency with truth, and not with falsehood? Schwarz 
(2004) proposed that individuals hold naïve theories about what their mental processing 
means, and use these naïve theories to interpret experienced fluency. Naïve theories thus 
likely constitute the link between fluency experiences and subsequent judgments, and 
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different naïve theories may give rise to different inferences and conclusions. For example, 
Winkielman and Schwarz (2001) asked participants to recall events from their childhood. 
Subsequently, participants’ naïve theories on whether positive or negative events are more 
difficult to retrieve were manipulated. The ease with which events from childhood could be 
retrieved influenced participants’ evaluations of their childhood—however, this impact 
depended on whether participants believed that positive or negative childhood events come to 
mind more easily, thus exemplifying the notion that the same metacognitive experience can 
give rise to very different conclusions. Intriguingly, naïve theories of meaning are themselves 
a function of prior learning. Unkelbach (2007) proposed that the fluency-truth link is learned 
throughout ontogenesis via feedback and reflects contingencies in the environment, such that 
true statements have a higher probability of being repeated and can thus be processed more 
fluently. In support of this argument, Unkelbach (2007) reported evidence showing that 
individuals can learn to associate fluency with falsehood (and not truth) by pairing fluent 
processing with falsehood. Note that explanations of naïve theories and feedback learning are 
not in competition but complement each other. 
Most research on the truth effect has concentrated on establishing the effect, that is, on 
whether, how, and in which direction fluency influences judgments of truth. Much less is 
known about when individuals use fluency as a signal of truth (and when they do not) and 
most importantly, how reliance on fluency changes over the course of time due to learning. 
The present research addresses these questions and suggests that individuals rely on fluency 
experiences especially when this strategy has proven successful in the past. We thus propose 
that individuals not only learn ”what” to infer from fluency (Unkelbach, 2007), but also 
”whether” fluency provides a judgmental basis for successful inferences in the first place. By 
way of this, the present contribution further advances our understanding of why there may be 
“wisdom in feelings” (Schwarz, 2002).  
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Moderators of fluency effects in judgments of truth  
Research on moderators of the truth effect can be categorized into two groups: truth 
effects that result from repetition, and truth effects that are independent of repetition. While 
both categories of findings focus on the same effect, namely the influence of more or less 
fluent processing on judgments of truth, their moderators differ strongly and have received 
unequal attention in previous research. With respect to repetition, a recent meta-analysis 
identified several moderators such as gist versus verbatim repetition, delay between sessions 1 
and 2, presentation of mixed lists containing old and new statements versus only one type of 
statement, response format, modality of experiment, modality of data collection, and level of 
processing (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). Additionally, other studies identified 
declining memory (Brown & Nix, 1996), declining context memory with age (Skurnik, Yoon, 
Park, & Schwarz, 2005), source credibility (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992), source 
variability (Roggeveen & Johar, 2002), and the direction of the repetition-truth relation 
(Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009) as moderators. Interestingly, these moderators pertain exclusively 
to repetition-based truth effects as they investigate different ways of inducing or experiencing 
repetition. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies that directly investigate 
which variables moderate fluency effects on judgments of truth that are independent of 
repetition. Specifically, Koch and Forgas (2012) showed that negative mood eliminated the 
truth effect compared to positive or neutral mood. Research by Hansen, Dechêne, and Wänke 
(2008) reveals that perceptual fluency affects judgments of truth when the discrepancy 
between actual and expected fluency is high and not low (for an overview of moderators of 
other fluency effects, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; see 
also Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). 
Against the background of the rather limited evidence on moderators of repetition-
independent truth effects, the present research investigates the flexibility of individuals’ 
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reliance on fluency experiences over the course of time when forming judgments of truth. We 
propose that reliance on fluency depends on the situational context and, more specifically, 
that judgments of truth reflect fluency experiences particularly when prior reliance on fluency 
has been a successful strategy. Although no direct evidence on this question is available, at 
least four lines of research pertaining to the influence of subjective experiences are relevant. 
First, it has been shown that when individuals think about the reasons for specific 
subsequent judgments, they rely less on fluency-based information sources such as familiarity 
than when individuals were not instructed to think about reasons (Halberstadt & Catty, 2008). 
Presumably this is because when asked to give reasons, individuals have a preference for 
rationally justifiable information sources, and are unable or not willing to use their feelings. 
Second, research suggests that individuals cease to rely on fluency experiences when 
the experiences’ diagnosticity is called into question. On the one hand, diagnosticity can be 
questioned by explicitly providing a reason for increased or decreased fluency. Specifically, 
Schwarz and colleagues (1991) reported that ease-of-retrieval effects on assertiveness 
judgments—the fluency with which information is retrieved from memory—were eliminated 
when experienced retrieval fluency was attributed to a source unrelated to the judgmental 
target. Similarly, Wänke, Schwarz, and Bless (1995) showed that frequency judgments were 
determined by the perceived diagnosticity of retrieval fluency (see also Briñol, Petty, & 
Tormala, 2006; for a review, see Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998, 
Greifeneder, et al., 2011). On the other hand, diagnosticity can be questioned more implicitly. 
For instance, individuals were shown to spontaneously discount and overcompensate for the 
perceived influence of fluency on judgments of frequency when alternative explanations for 
increased or decreased fluency were salient (Oppenheimer, 2004). Note that, in these cases, 
fluency experiences were rather explicitly dislinked from the judgmental target, that is, 
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fluency experiences were no longer attributed to the target stimulus. However, what if fluency 
is attributed to the target, but has proven unhelpful in prior learning (trials)? 
Third, indirect evidence for a flexible use of fluency that depends on the perceived 
validity of prior feeling-based judgments has been reported in the realm of affective feelings. 
Specifically, research by Avnet, Pham, and Stephen (2012) demonstrated that individuals rely 
more on their current mood state when they believed they had been successful with past 
reliance on their mood state rather than when they believe that they had been unsuccessful. 
Finally, Unkelbach (2007) has demonstrated that the interpretation of fluency in truth 
judgments is a function of its ecological validity (see also Unkelbach, 2006). When fluency 
was previously coupled with truth, participants exhibited the repetition-independent truth 
effect; however, when fluency was previously coupled with falsehood, fluent as compared to 
non-fluent presentation resulted in less (and not more) perceived truth. These findings suggest 
that individuals may adaptively learn the direction of the fluency-truth-correlation from prior 
experiences. Note that Unkelbach (2006; 2007) focused on the direction of the information 
provided by fluency. This manuscript focuses on learned validity and most importantly, on 
changes in reliance on fluency over the course of time.  
The present research 
Going beyond prior research, we propose that individuals are sensitive to whether 
prior reliance on fluency has resulted in correct or incorrect judgments. We argue that 
individuals’ reliance on fluency in truth judgments is a finely tuned metacognitive process 
that takes prior learning into account, thus guarding against undue inferences. Accordingly, 
individuals should tend to trust fluency experiences when prior fluency-based judgments were 
correct, whereas they should be cautious about relying on fluency experiences when prior 
judgments were incorrect. The focus of this manuscript is on changes in the reliance on 
fluency over the course of time.  
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To test these considerations, we conducted five experiments in which participants 
evaluated the truth of a large number of trivia statements. Building on prior research (e.g., 
Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Unkelbach, 2007), fluency 
was manipulated by means of color contrast. To manipulate prior success or failure when 
relying on fluency, participants received feedback indicating that reliance on fluency either 
was or was not a successful strategy. The proportion of judgments consistent with a fluency-
based judgmental strategy served as the main dependent variable. If participants do not rely 
on fluency, this measure should be at chance-level. In contrast, if participants rely on fluency 
as a signal of truth, this measure should be above chance-level. Across the five experiments, 
we tested (a) the hypothesis that individuals rely on fluency in truth judgments when fluency 
previously proved to be a successful cue (Experiments 1 to 5), (b) whether this effect 
generalizes to situations in which no feedback is provided (Experiments 2, 3, and 4), (c) 
whether this effect holds up when the similarity between learning and test trials is reduced 
(Experiment 3), or when the source of fluency is different between learning and test trials 
(Experiment 4), and (d) whether this effect disappears when other cues that do not differ in 
fluency are provided (testing pattern matching as an alternative hypothesis in Experiment 5).   
Because our experiments are built upon the methodology introduced by Unkelbach 
(2007), we start by reviewing Unkelbach’s approach more closely. Unkelbach (2007) 
provided strong evidence that the direction of the influence of fluency on truth judgments is a 
function of prior learning. While he investigated whether the direction of fluency can be 
learned, his hypotheses were not geared towards changes in reliance on fluency over the 
course of time as investigated in the present manuscript. In light of this difference in focus, 
two aspects of the employed methodology deserve discussion. Both aspects concern 
methodological choices with respect to the learning phase. 
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First, Unkelbach (2007) used only easy statements (e.g., “The formula for water is 
H2O.”). Because participants may be expected to have known the answers to at least some of 
these statements, participants may have used fluency and prior knowledge as cues in 
judgment. A judgment that looks like reliance on fluency does therefore not necessarily 
reflect reliance on fluency. Note that this is not problematic when fluency and truth status are 
orthogonal (as in the control condition in the learning phase of Unkelbach, 2007, Exp. 2) and 
when signal detection measures are used for analyses, because prior knowledge about truth 
status and the response bias’ magnitude can be estimated independently.1 It is, however, less 
diagnostic when fluency and truth status are perfectly correlated (as in the classic and 
reversed condition in the learning phase of Unkelbach, 2007, Exp. 2), because even signal 
detection analyses then only allow for overall estimates, but not for specific estimates for the 
high versus low fluent statements (based on which the truth effect is calculated). Note that this 
is unproblematic for the research question pursued by Unkelbach, but is critical when 
investigating the change in reliance on fluency in the learning phase and from the learning to 
the test phase, as pursued in the present project. For that reason, we changed Unkelbach’s 
methodology such that in the learning phase only difficult statements were used. Note that 
using only pretested difficult statements reduces the likelihood that participants know the 
truth but cannot forestall it, thus creating noise in the data. Obtaining an effect, however, 
would attest to the strength of the effect of feedback learning. Additionally, using statements 
where prior knowledge is likely helpful (Unkelbach, 2007) and not (present experiments) 
allows for more general conclusions about the learned reliance on fluency experiences.  
Second, by coupling fluency and truth status, two different sources of fluency were 
intermixed in Unkelbach’s (2007, Exp. 2) learning phase. Specifically, prior research has 
shown that truth/false status in the real world may be an independent source of fluency 
(Gilbert, 1991; Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009). Fluency due to color contrast 
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may thus be enhanced or decreased by fluency due to truth status (Unkelbach, 2007; 
Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009), resulting in a situation where the relative difference between high 
versus low color contrast statements is larger when high fluency is paired with truth (one 
condition), and smaller when high fluency is paired with falsehood (other condition). This is 
not problematic when investigating whether the meaning of fluency can be changed and when 
the focus is placed on the test phase only (as done by Unkelbach). It is, however, less 
diagnostic when the reliance on fluency during the learning phase and across learning and test 
phase is the main focus of interest as in the present experiments. For that reason, we used 
factually true statements only. 
These considerations are important, because as a consequence of these features, 
Unkelbach (2007) confined conclusions to the primary goal of demonstrating the learned 
direction of the information provided by fluency—even though a control group was available 
that resembles, on the surface level, the “fluency-not-valid groups” in the present 
experiments. However, for the reasons detailed above, our fluency-not-valid groups allow for 
testing whether the reliance on fluency changes over the course of time.  
In sum, building on Unkelbach’s (2007) finding that the direction of the information 
provided by fluency (true or false) can be learned, we investigate whether individuals may 
learn over the course of time to take fluency’s past validity into account when forming truth 
judgments. To this end, small but critical changes in methodology were introduced that allow 
for more precise conclusions about whether and to what extent fluency was used in truth 
judgments in the different phases of the experiment.  
Experiment 1 
 In a feedback-learning task, participants were asked to judge the truth of a series of 
factually true trivia statements differing in color contrast: Some statements were presented in 
high color contrast (high readability and associated high fluency), and other statements in low 
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color contrast (low readability and associated low fluency). Participants received tailored 
feedback about the correctness of their judgments so that some participants would learn that 
reliance on fluency is a successful strategy (readability-valid), while other participants would 
learn that fluency is not related to truth or falsehood (readability-not-valid). We expected 
participants to react to the feedback and to rely on fluency in the readability-valid condition, 
that is, to judge statements more frequently as true when presented in high as compared to 
low fluency. In contrast, participants in the readability-not-valid condition were expected to 
refrain from relying on fluency because the feedback implied that reliance on fluency is not a 
successful strategy. Importantly, this should be particularly apparent in later trials of the 
experiment, because learning from repeated feedback presumably requires numerous learning 
experiences. 
Method 
Eighty-eight students of a German university (43 females; Mage = 23.6 years, SD = 3.4) 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-valid vs. readability-
not-valid) x 2 (phase 1 vs. 2) mixed factorial design with readability-manipulation and phase 
as within factors.  
Participants read 56 factually true statements drawn from encyclopedia resources that 
were of similar length and were pre-tested as highly ambiguous with respect to truth (we 
chose statements for which 40% to 60% of participants indicated that they were true and for 
which certainty ratings were below 3 on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = absolutely uncertain 
to 5 = absolutely certain; sample statements read “The latest eruption of Láscar volcano was 
on 18th April 2006;” “Zirkalloy is characterized by high neutron permeability”). The order of 
statements was determined randomly but was identical for all participants. As the 
hypothesized effect was expected to emerge in later trials—that is, after participants had the 
chance to react to the provided feedback—the 56 statements were divided in two sets of 28 
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statements each, which will subsequently be referred to as Phase 1 and Phase 2. Readability 
was manipulated within participants by presenting statements in one of eight color contrasts 
(foreground-to-background), resulting in either high levels of contrast and associated 
perceptual fluency (e.g., dark green/light olive-green, dark purple/light purple), or low levels 
of contrast and associated perceptual fluency (e.g., olive-green/light olive-green, dark 
purple/purple). Each statement was presented individually and remained on the screen until 
”true/false” judgments were made. Participants provided their answers by clicking on ”true” 
or ”false” buttons, while response latencies were recorded.2 Subsequently, on a new screen 
(without seeing the statement any more), participants received feedback about the correctness 
of this answer. This feedback was tailored so that participants in the readability-valid 
condition would learn a positive relationship between fluency and ostensible truth (r = 1.0). In 
contrast, participants in the readability-not-valid condition would not learn such a 
relationship, because in this condition half of the high-readable and half of the low-readable 
statements were said to be true, whereas the remaining statements were said to be false, thus 
rendering readability undiagnostic about truth (r = .0). Both groups were not informed about 
how many high and low readable statements were said to be true or false. After receiving 
feedback, participants started the next trial. Finally, participants were debriefed and informed 
that all statements were true, were probed for suspiciousness, thanked, and remunerated with 
2 EUR.  
Results and Discussion 
For Phase 1 and 2, we calculated how often participants’ judgments were consistent 
with a fluency-based judgmental strategy (high readability= true; low readability= false). 
While participants in the readability-valid condition indicated that 61.3% of the high readable 
statements and 51% of the low readable statements were true, participants in the readable-not-
valid condition indicated that 52.7% of the high readable statements and 58.5% of the low 
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readable statements were true. Specifically, the number of high-readable statements rated as 
true plus the number of low-readable statements rated as false was related to the total of 28 
statements in each phase, yielding a percentage measure varying between 0 (all judgments 
contrary to reliance on fluency) and 100 (all judgments congruent with reliance on fluency), 
with 50 percent reflecting the chance-level midpoint. We opted for a percentage measure 
because it allows investigating changes in reliance on fluency over the course of time. 
The percentage measures for Phase 1 and Phase 2 were subjected to two analyses: 
first, to compare the use of fluency between conditions and over the course of time a 2 
(readability-valid vs. readability-not-valid) x 2 (phase 1 vs. 2) ANOVA with phase as within-
factor was computed; second, to assess the use of fluency in comparison to chance-level, 
planned comparisons were calculated. Figure 1 shows the predicted interaction between 
condition and phase, F(1, 86) = 6.15, MSE = 106.29, p < .02, ηp2 = .07. Participants in the 
readability-valid condition were more likely to rely on their fluency experiences in Phase 2 
than in Phase 1 (M = 51.95%, SD = 13.81, M = 58.36%, SD = 19.38, respectively), 
F(1, 43) = 7.22, MSE = 125.35, p < .02, d = .14; whereas no increase was observed in the 
readability-not-valid condition (M = 47.73%, SD = 9.84, M = 46.43%, SD = 7.47), F < 1.  
Planned comparisons with chance-level further underscore these findings. Participants 
in the readability-valid condition relied on fluency at chance-level in Phase 1 (M = 51.95%, 
SD = 13.81), t < 1, and above chance-level in Phase 2 (M = 58.36%, SD = 19.38), 
t(43) = 2.86, p < .01, d = .43. In contrast, participants in the readability-not-valid condition 
relied on fluency at chance-level in Phase 1 (M = 47.73%, SD = 9.84), t(43) = -1,53, p > .14, 
and below chance-level in Phase 2 (M = 46.43%, SD = 7.47), t(43) = -3.17, p < .01, d = .48. 
Overall, participants in the readability-valid condition relied more often on fluency 
experiences than participants in the readability-not-valid condition, F(1, 86) = 11.34, 
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MSE = 253.07, p < .01, ηp2 = .12. The main effect for phase was not significant, F < 2.71, 
p > .11.3 
The results suggest that participants were affected by the provided feedback. 
Participants relied on encoding fluency when forming truth judgments if prior feedback 
implied that such reliance is associated with correct judgments, but not when the feedback 
implied no relationship between fluency and truth. At first glance, a percentage level of 
marginally over 55 may not appear impressive. However, the observed effects are of similar 
or higher magnitude than those generally reported in investigations on the (repetition-
independent) effect of fluency on truth judgments (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999). 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1. 
Specifically, after the first two phases (with feedback), a third phase was added in which 
participants were no longer provided with feedback about the correctness of their judgments. 
If participants in the readability-valid condition learn in Phases 1 and 2 that fluency is a valid 
signal of truth, they should continue to rely on fluency even if no further feedback is provided 
in Phase 3.  
Method 
Seventy students from a German university (31 females; Mage = 22.1 years, SD = 2.7) 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-valid vs. readability-
not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with readability manipulation and 
phase as within-factors. In comparison to Experiment 1, a new set of factually true statements 
was pre-tested and color contrasts were changed so as to eliminate the possibility that effects 
were due to specific color contrast combinations. Participants were presented with 30 
statements in each of the three phases. During Phases 1 and 2, procedures were identical to 
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Experiment 1. Prior to Phase 3, participants were informed that the same task would continue, 
however without further feedback.  
Results and Discussion  
As in Experiment 1, the number of statements for which participants’ judgments were 
consistent with a fluency-based judgmental strategy was related to the total of 30 statements 
in each phase.4 These three percentage measures were analyzed with a planned Helmert 
contrast (2 -1 -1) (0 1 -1) in a 2 (readability-valid vs. readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 
vs. 3) mixed factorial design with phase as within-factor. This analysis results in two main 
effects of the contrast for phase and in two interactions of the contrast with condition. The 
interaction between the first effect of the contrast (2 -1 -1) and condition allows for testing the 
hypothesis that reliance on fluency increases from Phase 1 to Phases 2 and 3 for participants 
in the readability-valid condition, whereas no such increase is expected in the readability-not-
valid condition. The second effect of the contrast (0 1 -1) and its interaction with condition 
allow for testing an orthogonal set of contrasts and investigating whether reliance on fluency 
changes between Phase 2 and 3 in general and whether this change differs between 
conditions. For phase, the first main effect of the contrast (2 -1 -1) revealed that, overall, 
participants relied less on fluency in Phase 1 than in Phases 2 and 3 (M1 = 52.10%, 
SD1 = 10.48 vs. M2 = 54.57%, SD2 = 16.75, M3 = 57.62%, SD3 = 15.96), F(1, 68) = 5.03, 
MSE = 222.86, p < .03 ηp2 =.07. Additionally, as indicated by the second main effect of the 
contrast (0 1 -1), participants by tendency relied less on fluency in Phase 2 compared to Phase 
3, F(1, 68) = 3.33, MSE = 195.40.35, p = .08, ηp2 =.05. Simple effects analyses revealed that 
participants in the readability-valid condition relied more on fluency in Phases 2 and 3 than in 
Phase 1, F(1, 34) = 6.19, MSE = 251.31,  p < .02, ηp2 =.15, whereas this was not the case for 
participants in the readability-not-valid condition, F < 1. In both conditions, the reliance on 
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fluency did not differ between Phases 2 and 3, Fs < 2.36, ps > .14, MSEs > 251.31. Figure 2 
shows the observed pattern of results. 
Comparing the reliance on fluency with chance-level further underscores the 
differences between readability-valid and readability-not-valid conditions. Planned contrasts 
showed that in the readability-not-valid condition, reliance on fluency remained at chance-
level in all three phases (M1= 50.67%, SD1= 9.35, M2= 50.86%, SD2 = 10.86, M3 = 53.14%, 
SD3 = 11.05), ts < 1.68, ns. In contrast, in the readability-valid condition, reliance on fluency 
was marginally above chance-level in Phase 1 (M = 53.52%, SD = 11.46), t(34) = 1.82, 
p = .08, d = .31, and reliably above chance-level in Phase 2 (M = 58.29%, SD = 20.57), 
t(34) = 2.38, p < .03, d = .40; importantly, fluency remained above chance-level in Phase 3 
(M = 62.10%, SD = 18.81), t(34) = 3.81, p <.01, d = .64. Additionally, overall, participants in 
the readability-valid condition relied more often on fluency than participants in the 
readability-not-valid condition (M = 57.97%, SD = 14.53, M = 51.56%, SD = 6.06), 
F(1, 68) = 5.81, MSE = 123.85, p < .02, ηp2 = .08. In sum, the observed pattern supports the 
hypothesis that individuals particularly use fluency in truth judgments when prior reliance 
was successful. It should be noted, however, that the predicted first interaction of the contrast 
between phase and readability-valid/-not-valid-condition failed to reach conventional levels of 
significance, F < 2.23, MSE = 222.86, p = .14.  
The results of Experiment 2 replicate and extend the findings observed in 
Experiment 1. Again, when participants could learn that fluency is a valid signal of truth, 
reliance on fluency increased and was significantly above chance-level. In contrast, if the 
feedback was tailored such that fluency was not associated with truth, reliance on fluency 
remained at chance-level. Extending Experiment 1, this effect generalized to subsequent 
situations in which no further feedback about the correctness of participants’ responses was 
provided. These findings attest that individuals adaptively rely on fluency when forming truth 
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judgments depending on the success that was associated with reliance on fluency in preceding 
trials.  
Experiment 3 
In combination, Experiments 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that when forming truth 
judgments, individuals rely on the fluency of encoding as a function of whether or not such 
reliance has previously proven successful. Alternatively, one may speculate that participants 
did not rely on fluency, but based their judgments on learned associations between certain 
color-combinations and the truth status of statements. Note however, that in each experiment, 
we not only used one but several different color contrasts to manipulate high versus low 
fluency, rendering it unlikely that participants learned to associate specific combinations (e.g., 
dark olive-green/light olive-green) with truth or falsehood. Nevertheless, it appeared desirable 
to replicate and extend Experiment 2, such that in the third phase, fluency is manipulated 
differently from the first two phases (for a similar approach, see Unkelbach, 2007). To 
alienate Phase 3 from Phases 1 and 2—and thus to reduce the likelihood that individuals 
apply a specific color contrast = truth rule—different sets of color contrast were used for 
Phases 1 and 2 versus Phase 3. Additionally, statements were slightly tilted in Phase 3 to 
reduce presentation similarity to Phases 1 and 2 on a surface level. We expected that the 
generalization effect which emerged in Phase 3 of Experiment 2 would hold up even in the 
new alienated Phase 3. This expected pattern would question alternative explanations that rest 
on learned associations other than the hypothesized fluency-truth link.  
Method 
Forty-eight students from a German university (24 females; Mage = 23.3 years, 
SD = 3.1) were randomly assigned to a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-valid vs. 
readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with readability and 
phase as within-factors. Manipulations and dependent variables were identical to Experiment 
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2, apart from the following changes: In Phase 3, besides providing no feedback, fore- and 
background-colors were different from Phases 1 and 2. Additionally, statements were 
unsystematically slightly tilted to render Phase 3 more different from Phases 1 and 2 on the 
surface level.  
Results and Discussion 
The percentage of participants’ judgments consistent with a fluency-based judgmental 
strategy was calculated for each of the three phases. These percentage measures were 
analyzed using a planned Helmert contrast (2 -1 -1) (0 1 -1) in a 2 (readability-valid vs. 
readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with phase as within-
factor. As predicted, the first interaction of the contrast (2 -1 -1) with condition was 
significant, F(1, 46) = 7.86, MSE = 213.74, p < .01, ηp2 = .15, and reflected in further 
analyses: Figure 3 shows that from Phase 1 to Phases 2 and 3, the reliance on fluency 
increased significantly for participants in the readability-valid condition, F(1, 23) = 4.78, 
MSE = 278.02, p < .04, ηp2 = .17, and decreased, as a non-significant tendency, for 
participants in the readability-not-valid condition, F(1, 23) = 3.10, MSE = 149.45, p = .10, 
ηp2 = .12.  
Planned comparisons with chance-level further underscore these findings: While 
participants in the readability-valid condition relied on fluency at chance-level in Phase 1 
(M1 = 53.27%, SD1 = 15.33), t < 1, and above chance-level in Phases 2 and 3 (M2 = 59.97%, 
SD2 = 18.30, M3 = 61.46%, SD3 = 18.36), all ts > 2.67, ps < .02, ds > .54; participants in the 
readability-not-valid condition relied on fluency at chance-level in all three phases 
(M1 = 54.02%, SD1 = 11.60, M2 = 48.51%, SD2 = 8.49, M3 = 50.74%, SD3 = 12.14), 
|ts| < 1.70, ps > .11. Neither the second interaction of the contrast (0 1 -1) between phase and 
condition, nor the two main effects of the contrast for phase were significant, Fs < 1. 
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The results of Experiment 3 further support the hypothesis that individuals adaptively 
use fluency in truth judgments. Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, participants were more 
likely to rely on the fluency with which a statement could be encoded when reliance on 
fluency has proven successful in preceding situations.  
Experiment 4 
Experiments 1 to 3 support the hypothesis that individuals rely on fluency as a 
function of whether reliance on fluency previously proved to be successful or not. This was 
the case even when Phase 3 was alienated from Phases 1 and 2, suggesting that the observed 
pattern of results does not hinge on simple learned associations between specific color 
contrasts and truth. While Experiment 3 refutes some alternative explanations, one may still 
wish for more evidence attesting to the hypothesized fluency-truth link. Particularly, as 
participants in Experiment 3 could still learn that contrast in general is indicative for truth. In 
order to rule out this alternative interpretation and to show that learning effects still occur 
when using different kinds of fluency manipulations, we introduced another change to 
Phase 3. Specifically, by manipulating fluency in a way different from that used in Phases 1 
and 2, we created a situation in which Phases 1 and 2 as compared to Phase 3 are only 
conceptually similar (all manipulate fluency), but vary notably in terms of operationalization. 
Should participants’ judgmental behavior still carry over from Phases 1 and 2 to Phase 3, this 
would strongly support the suggested fluency-truth link, because alternative feature-based 
explanations (e.g., associations between color contrasts and truth) are not viable.  
Method 
Fifty students from a German university (41 females; Mage = 23.0 years, SD = 5.6) 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-valid vs. readability-
not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with readability and phase as 
within-factors. Manipulations and dependent variables were identical to Experiments 2 and 3, 
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apart from the following important changes: In Phase 3, readability was manipulated by 
reducing the space between letters and by rotating statements by 180° (in two-dimensional 
space). Specifically, high readable statements were presented with normal letter spacing 
(100%) and non-rotated, whereas low readable statements were presented with reduced letter 
spacing (70%) and rotation. To create variation, four different font-types of similarly high 
legibility were used (Times New Roman, Arial, Calibri, and Cambria).  
Results and Discussion 
For each of the three phases, the percentage of participants’ judgments consistent with 
a fluency-based judgmental strategy was calculated. These percentage measures were 
analyzed using a planned Helmert contrast (2 -1 -1) (0 1 -1) in a 2 (readability-valid vs. 
readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with phase as within-
factor. Again, the first interaction of the contrast (2 -1 -1) with condition was significant, 
F(1, 48) = 5.19, MSE = 180.09, p < .03, ηp2 = .10. As can be seen in Figure 4, reliance on 
fluency increased from Phase 1 to Phases 2 and 3 for participants in the readability-valid 
condition, F(1, 24) = 3.96, MSE = 272.57, p = .06, ηp2 = .14, but did not change for 
participants in the readability-not-valid condition, F(1, 24) = 1.22, MSE = 87.61, p > .28. 
Neither the second interaction of the contrast (0 1 -1) between phase and condition, nor the 
two main effects of the contrast for phase were significant, Fs < 1.41, MSEs > 314.35, 
ps > .25. Overall, participants in the readability-valid-condition relied more on fluency than 
participants in the readability-not-valid-condition, F(1, 48) = 12.74, MSE = 156.27, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .21. 
Planned comparisons with chance-level further underscore these findings: While 
participants in the readability-valid condition relied on fluency above chance-level in all three 
phases (M1 = 56.29%, SD1 = 14.30, M2 = 65.00%, SD2 = 24.24, M3 = 60.71%, SD3 = 21.63), 
all ts > 2.20, ps < .04, ds > .44; participants in the readability-not-valid condition relied on 
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fluency at chance-level in all three phases (M1 = 49.43%, SD1 = 7.34, M2 = 47.29%, 
SD2 = 10.53, M3 = 47.43%, SD3 = 8.22), |ts| < 1.57, ps > .14. 
The results of Experiment 4 further support the hypothesis that individuals adaptively 
rely on fluency when forming truth judgments. Replicating Experiments 1 to 3, participants 
were more likely to rely on fluency when reliance on fluency has previously proven 
successful. Critically, this pattern emerged even though fluency was elicited differentially in 
Phases 1 and 2 versus Phase 3, thus reducing the link between the learning phases and the test 
phase to the conceptual level. That the effect of reliance on fluency carried over even in such 
conditions strongly attests to the suggested fluency-truth link and refutes potential alternative 
explanations.  
Experiment 5 
Experiments 1 to 4 support the hypothesis that individuals rely on fluency experiences 
depending on whether reliance on fluency previously proved to be successful or not. This was 
even the case when fluency elicited in Phase 3 compared to Phases 1 and 2 differed on a 
surface-level (Experiment 3) or was only similar on the conceptual level (Experiment 4). Still, 
one could argue that what participants learnt is not a specific fluency association as argued 
here, but a general pattern linking one cue (e.g., fluency) to another cue (e.g., truth), and that 
participants simply matched this pattern from Phases 1 and 2 to Phase 3. This alternative 
account of pattern matching allows for the speculation that any new cue introduced in Phase 3 
would result in similar findings than the fluency cue of Experiments 2 to 4, because 
participants would simply match the pattern (one cue signals truth) to the new situation in 
Phase 3.5 To test this alternative account, we changed Phase 3 so that statements were 
presented with an orange or blue frame. Note that only the frame but not the statements 
themselves were of different colors. This created a situation in which a new (fluency-
unrelated) cue was present in Phase 3 to which the presumably learned general pattern (one 
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cue signals truth) could be matched. Should participants’ judgments differ as a function of 
readability-condition in Phase 3 compared to Phase 1, this would support a general pattern 
matching account and question a specific fluency hypothesis. In contrast, if participants’ 
judgments differentially reflect their learning experiences in Phases 1 and 2, but do not differ 
between Phases 1 and 3, then this would question a general pattern matching account and 
provide additional support for the suggested specific fluency-truth-link. 
In addition to testing the pattern matching account, Experiment 5 was meant to allow 
for additional insights as to how participants experienced the learning phases. To this end we 
asked participants several questions about how they perceived the feedback and how they 
formed their judgments.  
Method 
Forty-three students from a German university (24 females; Mage = 22.0 years, 
SD = 2.7) were randomly assigned to a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-valid vs. 
readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design with readability and 
phase as within-factors. Manipulations and dependent variables were identical to the previous 
experiments, apart from the following changes: statements in Phase 3 did not differ in fluency 
(all were presented in black Arial letters on a white background) but differed in whether they 
were surrounded by an orange or blue frame. Additionally, participants were asked to indicate 
in an open answer format the thoughts they had during the learning phases, and their 
agreement with the following six statements pertaining to the learning phases (1= I do not 
agree; 7 = I fully agree): “I have received more positive feedback in some domains than in 
others.” “The feedback was clear enough.” “The feedback was sufficient enough.” “I have 
known the truth status of most statements.” “I had to guess the truth status of most 
statements.” “For many statements, I have questioned the validity of the feedback.”6  
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Results and Discussion 
For each of the three phases, the percentage of participants’ judgments consistent with 
a fluency/cue-based judgmental strategy was calculated. These percentage measures were 
analyzed using a planned simple contrast with Phase 1 as reference point (-1 1 0) (-1 0 1) in a 
2 (readability-valid vs. readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design 
with phase as within-factor. As predicted, the main effect of the first simple contrast (-1 1 0), 
F(1, 41) = 3.92, MSE = 126.87, p = .06, ηp2 = .09, was qualified by an interaction between the 
first simple contrast and condition, F(1, 41) = 4.74, MSE = 126.87, p < .04, ηp2 = .10. As can 
be seen in Figure 5, reliance on fluency deceased in the readability-not-valid condition from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2, F(1, 21) = 7.33, MSE = 153.06, p < .02, and remained the same in the 
readability-valid-condition, F(1, 20) = 0.02, MSE = 99.37, p = .88. Importantly, suggesting 
that participants’ judgmental behavior in Phase 3 did not differ from their behavior in Phase 1, 
the main effect of the second simple contrast (-1 0 1), F(1, 41) = 1.14, MSE = 186.52, p = .29, 
and the interaction between the second simple contrast and condition were non-significant, 
F(1, 41) = 0.17, MSE = 186.52, p = .68. Additionally, the main effect for condition was non-
significant, F(1, 41) = 0.03, MSE = 28.91, p = .86. 
Planned comparisons with chance-level further underscore these findings: Participants 
in the readability-not-valid condition relied on fluency at chance-level in Phase 1 
(M1 = 52.44%, SD1 = 7.09; t(21) = 1.61, p = .12) and below chance-level in Phase 2 
(M2 = 45.29%, SD2 = 9.76; t(21) = -2.26, p < .04, d = 0.48) , while participants in the 
readability-valid condition relied on fluency at chance-level in both phases (M1 = 49.66%, 
SD1 = 8.74, M2 = 50.00%, SD2 = 8.53), |ts| < 0.18, ps > .86. In Phase 3, participants’ reliance 
on fluency in the readability-valid and the readability-not-valid-conditions was at chance-
level (M3 = 48.30%, SD3 = 9.76, M3 = 49.35%, SD3 = 9.90), |ts| < 0.80, ps > .43. 
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Participants’ open comments and their agreement with the six statements were 
analysed to obtain more insight in how participants experienced the learning phases. 
Suggesting a successful selection of difficult statements in Phases 1 and 2, 21 participants 
(48%) wrote that they did not know the truth status of most of the statements and that the 
statements were very difficult. Additionally, on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, participants more 
strongly agreed with having guessed (M = 6.30, SD = 0.94) than with having known the truth 
status of most of the statements (M = 1.81, SD = 1.14, F(1, 41) = 239.86, MSE = 1.80, 
p < .0001, ηp2 = .85. Neither the main effect for condition nor the interaction between 
question and condition were significant, Fs < 0.27, ps > .60. Suggesting that participants did 
not consciously identify or apply a “high readability/fluency=true, low 
readability/fluency=false-strategy,” none of the participants in the readability-valid-condition 
mentioned testing or applying such a strategy, and only one participant in the readability-not-
valid condition mentioned having wondered whether color contrast was indicative of truth. 
Analyses further revealed that readability-valid and readability-not-valid conditions did not 
differ in whether they judged the feedback as sufficient (M = 3.43, SD = 1.89; M = 3.64, 
SD = 1.81) and clear (M = 6.00, SD = 1.55; M = 5.64, SD = 1.33), and whether they indicated 
having received more positive feedback in some knowledge areas than in others (M = 4.10, 
SD = 1.76; M = 4.18, SD = 1.53),|t|s < 1 . Most importantly, suggesting that participants were 
not suspicious with respect to the feedback provided, none of the participants mentioned 
having received false feedback and three participants explicitly stated that they were 
interested in the feedback. Furthermore, readability-valid and readability-not-valid conditions 
did not differ significantly in their responses to an item assessing whether they questioned the 
validity of the feedback obtained (M = 3.57 SD = 1.96; M = 3.95, SD = 2.17), |t| < 1. To 
further analyse the potential role of feedback questioning, we divided the sample at the 
median (Md = 4) and reanalyzed the data in a 2 (readability high vs. low) x 2 (readability-
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valid vs. readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) x 2 (questioning feedback below 4 vs. 
equal and above the median) mixed factorial design with readability and phase as within-
factors. Pattern and significance levels remain the same as above. The main effect of the first 
simple contrast (-1 1 0), F(1, 39) = 3.07, MSE = 127.08, p < .09, ηp2 = .07, was qualified by 
an interaction between the first simple contrast and condition, F(1, 39) = 4.87, MSE = 127.08, 
p < .04, ηp2 = .11. Reliance on fluency decreased in the readability-not-valid condition from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2, F(1, 20) = 6.38, MSE = 158.80, p < .02, and remained the same in the 
readability-valid-condition, F(1, 19) = 0.14, MSE = 93.69, p = .71. Again, suggesting that 
participants’ judgmental behavior in Phase 3 did not differ from their behavior in Phase 1, the 
main effect of the second simple contrast (-1 0 1), F(1, 39) = 1.49, MSE = 189.23, p = .23, 
and the interaction between the second simple contrast and condition were non-significant, 
F(1, 39) = 0.27, MSE = 189.23, p = .61. Most importantly, the main effect of questioning the 
feedback and its’ interactions and all other effects were non-significant, Fs < 1.68 and 
ps > .20. In sum, this analysis showed that participants who questioned the feedback more do 
not behave significantly differently from participants who questioned the feedback less. 
Though at least partially informative, a median-split analysis cannot fully correct for the 
effects of questioning feedback. To further address this critical issue, we focused data analysis 
on those participants who hardly questioned the feedback (= below 4; N = 18), in a 
2 (readability-valid vs. readability-not-valid) x 3 (phase 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) mixed factorial design 
with phase as within-factor. While being particularly conservative, this analysis procedure 
comes with the downside of a small sample size; we counteracted this downside by 
computing the error-term on the basis of the full design. Paralleling the above reported results, 
reliance on fluency tended to decrease in the readability-not-valid condition from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2, F(1, 41) = 2.19, MSE = 126.87, p = .15, and tended to remain the same in the 
readability-valid-condition, F(1, 41) = 1.12, MSE = 126.87, p = .30. Most importantly, the 
WHEN FLUENCY SIGNALS TRUTH   27 
 
analysis revealed the predicted interaction between the first simple contrast and validity-
condition, F(1, 41) = 3.22, MSE = 126.87, p = .08. Again, suggesting that participants’ 
judgmental behavior in Phase 3 did not differ from their behavior in Phase 1, the main effect 
of the second simple contrast (-1 0 1), F(1, 41) = 2.19, MSE = 186.52, p = .15, and the 
interaction between the second simple contrast and condition were non-significant, 
F(1, 41) = 0.55, MSE = 186.52, p = .46. Additionally, the main effect for the first simple 
contrast, F(1, 41) = 0.09, MSE = 126.87, p = .77, and the main effect for condition, 
F(1, 41) = 0.02, MSE = 28.91, p = .88, were non-significant. In sum, the median split analysis 
and the particularly conservative analysis with the reduced sample indicate that questioning 
the feedback does not significantly alter the general pattern of results. Very cautiously we 
therefore suggest that feedback questioning does not qualify as a strong alternative 
explanation.  
The results of Experiment 5 provide additional support for the hypothesis that 
individuals adaptively rely on fluency when forming truth judgments. Importantly, 
judgmental behavior in Phases 1 and 3 did not differ, thus reducing the likelihood that the 
results are due to a potential alternative cue-based explanation. Participants’ open comments 
and their agreement with the six statements suggest that participants neither engaged in 
pattern–matching nor deliberately identified a “high readability/fluency=true, low 
readability/fluency=false-strategy.” Additionally, the adaptive use of fluency still holds when 
controlling for the influence of questioning the validity of the feedback obtained and when 
analysing only those participants who hardly questioned the feedback’s validity. Contrary to 
Experiments 1 to 4, reliance on fluency did not increase for the readability-valid condition in 
Phase 2 compared to Phase 1. As a result, one might ask whether learning occurred in 
Experiment 5. Note, however, that Phase 2 was similar to the previous four experiments, 
which all reflected significant increases from Phase 1 to 2; it therefore appears possible that 
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the non-significant increase in Experiment 5 is due to chance. What is more important is the 
observed decrease in reliance on fluency in the readability-not-valid condition, suggesting that 
participants did learn from experiences in Experiment 5, too.  
General Discussion 
Previous research that investigated the impact of encoding fluency on truth judgments 
has focused primarily on establishing and documenting the effect, namely, on whether, how, 
and in which direction fluency influences truth judgments (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; 
Unkelbach, 2007). While there is considerable evidence about variables that moderate 
repetition-based truth effects (for an overview, see Dechêne, et al., 2010), much less is known 
about what moderates truth effects that are due to differences in encoding fluency but that are 
not due to repetition (see Hansen, et al., 2008, for an exception pertaining to the discrepancy 
between expected and experienced fluency). The results reported in the present contribution 
directly address this issue in various aspects.  
Replicating previous research (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007), five 
experiments support the assumption that encoding fluency influences truth judgments. 
Specifically, statements were more likely to be considered true when the statements could be 
encoded fluently rather than non-fluently. Going beyond demonstrating that fluency-based 
truth effects are a reliable phenomenon, the present work shows that individuals’ reliance on 
fluency is moderated by the experienced validity of fluency as a cue over the course of time. 
Specifically, participants’ judgments were more likely to reflect an impact of encoding 
fluency when participants had previously experienced that relying on fluency resulted in 
correct judgments. Moreover, fluency as a cue received more weight when individuals had 
more learning trials to experience fluency as a valid cue for truth judgments. In contrast, when 
the feedback was tailored such that fluency was not associated with truth, reliance on fluency 
remained at chance-level or decreased over the course of time. Experiments 2 to 4 further 
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showed that reliance on fluency carried over from trials with feedback to trials in which no 
feedback was provided. The results of Experiments 3 to 5 suggest that the observed findings 
are not easily attributed to explanations other than fluency, such as an association between 
truth status and color contrast or a general pattern matching account. For instance, fluency 
continued to influence truth judgments even when manipulations of fluency were related only 
on a conceptual level (Experiment 4). The results of Experiment 5 further suggest that the 
adaptive use of fluency is independent of whether participants questioned the validity of the 
feedback obtained. 
Three aspects of the present experiments deserve additional discussion. First, on the 
basis of the data, we cannot know for sure whether participants in the fluency-not-valid 
condition reduced reliance on fluency because participants had learned that fluency was a 
useless cue or because of a lack of learning experiences that fluency may be a valid cue. 
However, research by Unkelbach (2007) suggests that fluency is an ecological valid cue, and 
research by Oppenheimer (2004) holds that individuals rely on fluency experiences even in 
one-shot decisions. It therefore appears fair to assume that participants in the current set of 
studies started out by relying on fluency, increased their reliance when learning that fluency is 
a valid cue, and decreased their reliance when learning that fluency is not a valid cue.  
 Second, against the background of the here presented evidence, one may wonder 
whether relying on fluency is a more conscious or more unconscious strategy. The 
experiments reported here allowed for some hint as to this intriguing question by analyzing 
self-report data. Yet, despite the insights offered, it will likely prove fruitful in future research 
to develop methods that go beyond self-reports. This is because prompting participants for 
their strategy in think-aloud protocols or in post-hoc assessments (such as in Experiment 5) 
may not allow for valid conclusions. For instance, participants in Experiment 5 did not 
mention having identified or applied a “high readability/fluency=true, low 
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readability/fluency=false-strategy,” though their judgmental behaviour strongly suggest that 
they did in Phase 2. Only one participant in the fluency-not-valid condition mentioned having 
tested for an association between color contrast and truth (but could not identify any). The 
more abstract concept fluency was not mentioned at all. This suggests that participants were 
not able to consciously name the true causes of their judgmental behaviour, and is reminiscent 
of Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) more general account on the problems associated with 
introspection. But even if participants were able to correctly name their judgmental strategy, 
would they dare saying that they relied on a feeling (instead of “hard facts”), given that 
reliance on feelings is generally not considered a rational or even adaptive strategy (Elster, 
1999)? Problems with introspection and social desirability effects may thus reduce the 
validity of self-reports, generating a need for methods that allow for dissociating strategies by 
other means. 
Third, the obtained findings demonstrate that individuals learn over the course of time 
that it may be more or less successful to base truth judgments on fluency. Specifically, 
Experiments 2 to 4 consistently show that participants’ reliance on fluency reflects prior 
experiences with fluency as a cue to truth. Such a flexible use of fluency experiences is in line 
with general theorizing on the role of subjective feelings, which holds that feelings are a 
generally valuable and functional source of information (see Greifeneder, et al., 2011; 
Schwarz, 2002; Greifeneder, Bless, & Scholl, 2013). Unkelbach (2007), for instance, argued 
that individuals learn in everyday life that fluency and truth are positively correlated; hence 
that fluency is an ecologically valid source of information. Relatedly, Hertwig, Herzog, 
Schooler, and Reimer (2008) proposed that fluency is an ecologically valid cue in inferences 
of city sizes.  
Interestingly, besides demonstrating that individuals rely on fluency when it is a valid 
source of information, the obtained results also suggest that individuals may adapt their 
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reliance on fluency to different situations. In the present set of studies, individuals’ reliance 
on experienced fluency reflected prior learning experiences even in highly different contexts 
in which fluency experiences were similar on a conceptual level only. Bearing in mind the 
dangers of comparing data across different experiments, it appears instructive to note that the 
difference in the reliance on fluency between fluency-valid and fluency-not-valid conditions 
decreases with decreasing similarity between the feedback phases (1 and 2) and Phase 3. This 
places emphasis on individuals’ sensitivity not only to prior learning experiences with 
fluency’s validity but also to differences in the context in which truth judgments have to be 
made. The latter also converges with research on subjective experiences that has documented 
that individuals may refrain from relying on subjective experiences as a judgmental cue. For 
example, individuals in Unkelbach (2007) did not rely on fluency when they have learned that 
fluency is an invalid cue for truth judgments. Moreover, individuals refrained from relying on 
the ease-of-retrieval heuristic when they believed that the fluent versus non-fluent retrieval of 
information from memory was not related to the information that was retrieved (Greifeneder 
& Bless, 2007; Schwarz, et al., 1991). Note however, that none of these studies investigated 
reliance on feelings over the course of time as in the present manuscript.  
The present evidence suggests that reliance on fluency in particular, and perhaps on 
feelings in general, is a generally sensible judgmental mechanism. To some, this conclusion 
may be surprising, given that the mechanisms underlying reliance on feelings in judgment 
(attribution to target, inferences based on naïve theories, see Schwarz, 2004) are often frugal 
and crude. The present findings offer further evidence to this puzzle by attesting to the 
flexibility with which individuals rely on fluency in truth judgments. In that respect, we 
speculate that most likely, the adaptive use of fluency is not limited to truth judgments. 
Indeed, because fluency has been shown to influence a large variety of judgments, including 
judgments of fame (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989), knowing (Koriat, 1993), 
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policy support (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001), and frequency (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and evaluations of inferences (Ozubko & Fugelsang, 
2011), it appears fair to assume that the here observed adaptive use of fluency likely extends 
to other types of judgments, too.  
In concluding, it is interesting to note that learning associations between fluency and 
truth may not only regulate the direction of what to infer from a specific fluency experience 
(as shown in previous research, Unkelbach, 2007), but also when to infer meaning from a 
specific fluency experience in the first place. This is important because the judgmental 
consequences of “having some meaning” are likely different from “no meaning.” When 
fluency means “something,” fluency may be a reasonable source of information in judgment; 
when fluency has no meaning with respect to a specific target, it should not be used at all. As 
such, the present findings extend earlier evidence and attest to their critical role of previous 
experiences with the judgmental validity of fluency as a cue in fluency research. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Means (with standard errors) of participants’ reliance on fluency in Experiment 1, 
separately for the readability-valid condition (n = 44) versus the readability-not-valid 
condition (n = 44), and the two experimental phases. 
Figure 2. Means (with standard errors) of participants’ reliance on fluency in Experiment 2, 
separately for the readability-valid condition (n = 35) versus the readability-not-valid 
condition (n = 35), and the three experimental phases (Phases 1 and 2 with feedback; Phase 3 
without feedback).  
Figure 3. Means (with standard errors) of participants’ reliance on fluency in Experiment 3, 
separately for the readability-valid condition (n = 24) versus the readability-not-valid 
condition (n = 24), and the three experimental phases (Phases 1 and 2 with feedback; Phase 3 
without feedback). 
Figure 4. Means (with standard errors) of participants’ reliance on fluency in Experiment 4, 
separately for the readability-valid condition (n = 25) versus the readability-not-valid 
condition (n = 25), and the three experimental phases (Phases 1 and 2 with feedback; Phase 3 
without feedback). 
Figure 5. Means (with standard errors) of participants’ reliance on fluency/general cue in 
Experiment 5, separately for the readability-valid condition (n = 21) versus the readability-
not-valid condition (n = 22), and the three experimental phases (Phases 1 and 2 with 
feedback; Phase 3 without feedback and general but not fluency cue). 
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Footnotes 
1For signal detection analysis, participants’ responses to high fluent and low fluent 
statements are classified as hits, misses, correct rejections, or false alarms, with respect to the 
criterion truth status in the real world. Signal detection analysis allows for estimating the 
ability to discriminate between true and false statements (discrimination ability d’), and the 
tendency to respond „true“ (response bias β; see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). In fluency-truth 
research, a significant difference in the response bias β for high fluent versus low fluent 
statements reflects a tendency to respond true to fluent, and false to less fluent statements, and 
is therefore indicative of a truth effect (Unkelbach, 2007). 
2Because the color contrast manipulation has proven successful in prior research (e.g., 
Reber & Schwarz, 1999), it appears safe to assume that differences in perceptual fluency are 
elicited. Nevertheless, to support the claim that differences in fluency are elicited, we 
recorded latencies that reflect the interval between stimulus onset and decision. Under the 
assumption that it is stimulus perception but not the process of response formation that is 
affected by the color contrast manipulation, these latencies offer some indication about the 
manipulations’ success (see Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 2004; Wurtz, Reber, & 
Zimmermann, 2008, for a discussion). For every experiment, these manipulation checks 
suggest that differences in perceptual fluency were elicited. Due to space limitations, full 
results are not reported in text, but are available from the authors.  
3To address learning over trials, we fitted the percentage of judgments per trial in 
accordance with a fluency-based judgmental strategy (high readability=true; low 
readability=false) to a linear function separately for the readability-valid- and readability-not-
valid conditions. Over trials, reliance on fluency was described by a linear function in the 
readability-valid-condition (y = 47.48 + 0.24 * x; R2 = .092), F(1,54) = 5.48, p < .03, but not 
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in the readability-not-valid-condition (y = 45.48 + 0.06 * x; R2 = .005), F(1,54) = 0.27, 
p = .61. 
4Participants in the readability-valid condition indicated that 66.8% of the high 
readable statements and 50.8% of the low readable statements were true, while participants in 
the readable-not-valid condition indicated that 59.2% of the high readable statements and 
55.5% of the low readable statements were true. Similar patterns were obtained in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Results are available from the authors. 
5We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting the design of Experiment 5.  
6At the end of each of the Experiments 1 to 4, participants were asked about the 
purpose of the present experiment. These open statements are some first helpful indicators 
with respect to participants’ suspiciousness having received false feedback, conscious usage 
of a “high readability/fluency=true, low readability/fluency=false-strategy”strategy, and 
identification and application of a pattern matching strategy. Deception: None of the 
participants mentioned suspiciousness with respect to the feedback’s validity. Conscious 
strategy: Five participants mentioned the influence of color-contrast, three participants the 
influence of readability, and four participants the influence of the appearance of the 
statements on decision making or truth judgments, however, without specifying or even 
addressing the fluency-truth correlation. Another participant addressed the influence of 
readability on response times (but not on truth). Finally, one participant—however, in a 
readability-not-valid condition—mentioned a positive readability-truth-correlation. Note that 
none of the participants mentioned “fluency” or the transfer from Phases 1 and 2 to Phase 3. 
Pattern matching: Only one participant mentioned that she had searched for but couldn’t 
identify any patterns (despite the fact that she was in a readability-valid-condition), two other 
participants mentioned that the aim of the researchers was detecting patterns in decision 
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making but it remains a question of interpretation whether they also refer to their own 
strategies.  
Because excluding these participants did not change the overall pattern of results in 
any of the experiments, we conducted all analyses in the manuscript with all participants.  
 
